Sunday, February 21, 2010

Values in Science

其实,我一直想写一篇关于科学价值的文章。。。但是,要谈所谓的科学价值观和科学态度其实并不容易。。。这实在是一个蛮笼统,很难有一个具体重点的议题。。。没有深入的认知和体悟,就一定没有办法写得好。。。而且丰富的阅读也很重要。。。在事件的发生,演变上去截取重要的价值判断。。。我想,这就是做社会科学、哲学、宗教和历史的难度。。。

做科学研究,本来就不只是做实验,取data,分析和做结论那么简单。。。在这里头的过程中,态度其实更为重要。。。很多时候,其实是一种本末倒置的做法:想得到某些结论,才去设计一些对结论有帮助的实验。。。往往没有再三的测试,检讨得到的数据,做出来的东西其实就只是一堆垃圾。。。但是话说回来,对自己的数据太过保守的话,往往却对自己有不利的影响。。。太过轻视自己的实验和数据,会让自己深锁在没有自信和信心的窘境里头(我有时候就有这样的问题)。。。如何去大胆假设,小心求证,其实是做科研人一生的功课。。。

在网上溜达,无意间看到了一篇关于《科学的价值观》文章。。。有些许的感触,文章好像有点长,但是其实深入浅出,很值得与大家分享,也是对自己的一种提醒。。。

其实,做任何事,都要能过自己的良心。。。而什么是良心?我想就取决于自我的价值判断。。。而个人的价值判断,是一个个体从各各方面吸收回来的养分,是一个人一生的功课,从一出生就在上课,到停止呼吸的最后一刻。。。

文章的最后一段是我特别喜欢的,也是整篇的重点所在:
“一位所谓的科学家最大的挑战,是注意到和尝试去理解研究领域背后的信念和推测,并运用这样的自我认知不断在特定的研究领域上精进。而这样的自我检测,来自于他不断从各个领域学习,吸收和检讨回来的的价值判断:从历史,哲学,社会学,文学,艺术,宗教到所谓的道德规范。如果专研在自我的特定领域中,而无法建立和发展出在科研工作上需要的价值判断,那他将在他的工作上遭受挫折。”


转载自:http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=4917&page=6

VALUES IN SCIENCE

Scientists bring more than just a toolbox of techniques to their work. Scientist must also make complex decisions about the interpretation of data, about which problems to pursue, and about when to conclude an experiment. They have to decide the best ways to work with others and exchange information. Taken together, these matters of judgment contribute greatly to the craft of science, and the character of a person's individual decisions helps determine that person's scientific style (as well as, on occasion, the impact of that person's work).

Much of the knowledge and skill needed to make good decisions in science is learned through personal experience and interactions with other scientists. But some of this ability is hard to teach or even describe. Many of the intangible influences on scientific discovery—curiosity, intuition, creativity—largely defy rational analysis, yet they are among the tools that scientists bring to their work.

When judgment is recognized as a scientific tool, it is easier to see how science can be influenced by values. Consider, for example, the way people judge between competing hypotheses. In a given area of science, several different explanations may account for the available facts equally well, with each suggesting an alternate route for further research. How do researchers pick among them?

Scientists and philosophers have proposed several criteria by which promising scientific hypotheses can be distinguished from less fruitful ones. Hypotheses should be internally consistent so that they do not generate contradictory conclusions. Their ability to provide accurate experimental predictions, sometimes in areas far removed from the original domain of the hypothesis, is viewed with great favor. With disciplines in which experimentation is less straightforward, such as geology, astronomy, or many of the social sciences, good hypotheses should be able to unify disparate observations. Also highly prized are simplicity and its more refined cousin, elegance.

Other kinds of values also come into play in science. Historians, sociologists, and other students of science have shown that social and personal beliefs—including philosophical, thematic, religious, cultural, political, and economic beliefs—can shape scientific judgment in fundamental ways. For example, Einstein's rejection of quantum mechanics as an irreducible description of nature—summarized in his insistence that "God does not play dice"—seems to have been based largely on an aesthetic conviction that the physical universe could not contain such an inherent component of randomness. The nineteenth-century geologist Charles Lyell, who championed the idea that geological change occurs incrementally rather than catastrophically, may have been influenced as much by his religious views as by his geological observations. He favored the notion of a God who is an unmoved mover and does not intervene in His creation. Such a God, thought Lyell, would produce a world in which the same causes and effects keep cycling eternally, producing a uniform geological history.

Does holding such values harm a person's science? In some cases the answer has to be "yes." The history of science offers a number of episodes in which social or personal beliefs distorted the work of researchers. The field of eugenics used the techniques of science to try to demonstrate the inferiority of certain races. The ideological rejection of Mendelian genetics in the Soviet Union beginning in the 1930s crippled Soviet biology for decades.

Despite such cautionary episodes, it is clear that values cannot—and should not—be separated from science. The desire to do good work is a human value. So is the conviction that standards of honesty and objectivity need to be maintained. The belief that the universe is simple and coherent has led to great advances in science. If researchers did not believe that the world can be described in terms of a relatively small number of fundamental principles, science would amount to no more than organized observation. Religious convictions about the nature of the universe have also led to important scientific insights, as in the case of Lyell discussed above.

The empirical link between scientific knowledge and the physical, biological, and social world constrains the influence of values in science. Researchers are continually testing their theories about the world against observations. If hypotheses do not accord with observations, they will eventually fall from favor (though scientists may hold on to a hypothesis even in the face of some conflicting evidence since sometimes it is the evidence rather than the hypothesis that is mistaken).

The social mechanisms of science also help eliminate distorting effects that personal values might have. They subject scientific claims to the process of collective validation, applying different perspectives to the same body of observations and hypotheses.

The challenge for individual scientists is to acknowledge and try to understand the suppositions and beliefs that lie behind their own work so that they can use that self-knowledge to advance their work. Such self-examination can be informed by study in many areas outside of science, including history, philosophy, sociology, literature, art, religion, and ethics. If narrow specialization and a single-minded focus on a single activity keep a researcher from developing the perspective and fine sense of discrimination needed to apply values in science, that person's work can suffer.

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